Defining Terrorism

Since the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, the public and the government view a terrorist as someone from the Middle East who uses violence and attacks innocent people and symbolic targets, because of religious views. However, the use of terror as a tactic has been around for hundreds of years and has been used by the state as well as by non-state actors. Many different groups have used terror to benefit their goal, whether it is political or financial. By labeling a group or a specific individual a terrorist, it does not help combat the main issue and reason for the violence.

Today, when a state labels a group as being terrorists, the main tactic used to defeat the group is violence. Often times this just leads to more violence, both by the state and the terrorist groups. To resolve the issue, it is important that instead of just calling a group a terrorist group, you identify the reason for their fighting and try to resolve the key issue in their reason for fighting.

In 2002, the State Department defined terrorism as “politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience,” (Ruby 2002:10). A definition like this creates a disadvantage because of the need for information on motivations and intentions, which is rarely available in cases of collective violence. According to Tilly “…the States Department’s working definition of terror singles out violence committed by relatively well-connected groups and directed against politically significant targets of other nationalities, especially of American nationality,” (2014, pp. 8). It is important that a definition is not specific in trying to explain something that is so broad and ever changing. This limits the ability to study and understand certain actions and groups that may not fit in the definition. Many times financially motivated groups use terror, but under this definition they are not deemed terrorists. Since the definition would have to be so long and broad, it would be more beneficial to study a group individually rather than as a larger group.

            When a state labels a specific group a terrorist group, they often no longer have legitimate views and will not be bargained with. This gives ultimate power to the state. The United States see Al Qaeda, ISIS, and other Middle Eastern groups as the central terrorists around the world. After the attacks on 9/11, President Bush said, “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” This is far from the case however. In 2014, Boko Haram, an Islamic group based in Nigeria, killed more civilians than ISIS, but there was little publicity covering it because it did not impact U.S. interests or its citizens. There was also very little global support during this time. This shows that every “terrorist” group is not important enough for the global powers to intervene, even if they are the deadliest in the world. This was also relevant before 9/11. “Unsurprisingly, the State Department’s summaries of international terrorist incidents give special attention to attacks on American interests…” (Tilly, 2004, pp. 8). This shows that there may be more terrorist groups or attacks, but they may not be officially recorded as a terrorist act by countries that are not affected. 

            The term “terrorist group” is also used by states that previously funded a group’s activities, but when that group became useless to the state, they were labeled a terrorist group. Two examples of this were the height of the cocaine drug trade in Colombia, and piracy in the 1600s. In Colombia, the U.S. was funding groups such as the AUC, United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, who fought the FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Originally the U.S. government stated that the AUC was promoting democracy and the rule of law. These groups were actually committing human right atrocities. However, since they were helping the cause against the FARC and drug cartels, these actions were not punished by the US, even though they clearly had the opportunity to do so. Instead, they waited until they were discovered to be helping the drug flow into the U.S. to declare them an official terrorist group. The Columbia drug cartels, were using terror for financial gains. The U.S. only considered them a terrorist group once they were hurting the U.S., but previously funded them for their own gain even though they were harming others (Schwam-Baird, 2015).

            This also occurred with pirates right before the “golden age” of piracy. Originally, states funded privateers to attack ships from other countries and steal their gold and other goods. In 1667 Henry Morgan went outside of his bill of marque and sacked the Port of Panama. He returned money back to the King of England and was declared a hero. However, in 1699 Captain William Kid did the exact same thing and went outside of his bill of marque, but instead of being praised, he was punished. This shows that the state decides whether a group is a terrorist group based on whether or not they benefit from them, not based on their actions of violence.

The state is able to control groups by declaring them a terrorist group. An example of this is the Kurds in Turkey. “Historically speaking, BHN (basic human needs) began to be stripped from the Kurds when the Ottoman Empire began to decline in 1913,” (Stempel, 2014). The Kurds continued to receive harsh treatment by the Turkish government for generations. In the 1920s and 1930s uprisings by the Kurds resulted in the Turkish government by banning Kurdish names and costumes, and forcing them to resettle. This lead to the creation of the PKK, or the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, to combat against the hostile government. There was on and off fighting from 1984 to 2013, when the PKK and Turkish government created a bilateral cease-fire and the began peace talks. However, “The cease-fire has now ended. Turkey broke it when it launched what is, according to a pro-government journalist, a “comprehensive” operation against the “terrorist” PKK,” (Hemish, 2015). This shows that the PKK are willing to work with the government to create peace, but the government views them as a terrorist group with the only solution to stop them is through violence. The state would rather continue fighting than give the Kurds rights. The title of a terrorist group makes their movement seen as a negative in other countries because they are identified as a terrorist group.

            It is more beneficial to describe terror as a tactic or tool, not by defining it with a feature of a group. Previous research shows that counterinsurgency groups were rational thinkers, unlike what we see as terrorist groups today. In 1962, the Rand conference on counterinsurgency discussed the structural problems in regions that often lead to counterinsurgency. The main points were unemployment, inequality, and colonialism. This is still true to this day, but instead of trying to fix the main issues, countries think they are going to fix it through more violence. Still, to this day, groups we consider terrorists are strongest in regions, where there is instability and lack of an effective government with a stable social system (Stampnitzky, 2013).

            It is very difficult to have a concrete definition to understand terrorism because of the vast tactics and different causes of the varied groups. “Properly understood, terror is a strategy, not a creed. Terrorism ranges across a wide spectrum of organizations, circumstances, and beliefs. Terrorism is not a single causally coherent phenomenon. No social scientist can speak responsibly as though it were,” (Tilly, 2004, pp.11-12). To better understand the violence used by the groups, it is important to understand the root causes of their organizations and their goals and aim to fix them. It would be more effective to attack the problem through diplomacy, tolerance and compromise, rather than attack the terrorist group with violence.

Work Cited

Hemish, M. (2015). A history of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. TeleSUR. http://www.telesurtv.

net/english/analysis/A-History-of-the-Turkish-Kurdish-Conflict-20150728-0042.html

Schwam-Baird, D. (2015). Frankenstein in Colombia: America's policy missteps and the

paramilitaries. Journal of the Third World Studies. 32(2), 123-151

Stampnitzky, L. (2013). Disciplining terror: How experts invented “terrorism”. New York,

U.S.: Cambridge University Press. (1-19, 49-82)

Stempel, K. M. (2014). The Turkish-Kurdish Conflict in Theory and Practice. Inquiries Journal,

6(3), https://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/862/the-turkish-kurdish-conflict-in-theory-and-practice

Tilly, C. (2004). Terror, terrorism, terrorists. Sociological Theory, 22(1), 5-13