Sunday, March 26, 2017

Blog Post #2 3/26: The Response to Terror

David Solomon
Professor Shirk
POL 357-B
26 March 2017

The Response to Terror

After studying the units pertaining to the Algerian War of Independence and the Arab conflict, I was able to draw on a similarity between two. In both cases, the governments involved (Israel & France ) had an unproportionate response to the terrorist groups’ actions against their states. What is meant by unproportionate response is that the actions taken by these governments to mitigate or curb the operations of the supposed terrorist groups were in many cases overly harsh and lethal. Although many would argue against this, the history behind both of these cases speaks for itself. Especially pertaining to the conflict in Israel, simply looking at the death tolls on both sides shows a glaring discrepancy. Ultimately, this unproportionate response observed in both instances was/is counterproductive because (1) it only perpetuated further conflict, and (2) France and Israel were/have been unsuccessful in stopping the efforts of the supposed terrorist groups.
The conflict between the FLN and the French government was sparked by the Setif Massacre of 1945 where 103 French settlers were killed by Algerian rebels. The massacre was the culmination of various factors playing into the increased tensions observed between native Algerians and their French colonial “oppressors.” Nevertheless, the response from the French government can arguably be seen as the use of state sponsored terrorism. In coalition with Algerian authorities, the French government created a state in which Algerian natives were purposefully sought after and persecuted against (Thomas 221). This type of action would persist for the next ten years and as a result inevitably create the FLN. Thomas C. Martin makes note of why native Algerians joined the FLN in his article, Violence in the Algerian War of Independence Terror, counter-terror, and compliance. He states:
For some, the lived experience of participating in the first anti-colonial rebellion of the post-World War II era- the Setif uprising of May 1945 -was pivotal. Others were radicalized by the ensuing French crackdown. Its severity was such that the Algerian death toll probably exceeded 7,000 civilian victims, possibly many more. Arguably, Setif's aftermath did more to radicalize the emerging generation of nationalist activists than the preceding wartime years. (Thomas 222)

The creation of the FLN marked the beginning of the Algerian War of Independence and the continual conflict between the French government and Algerian rebels. Labeled a terrorist group, the FLN was targeted against with great prejudice by the French government. As a result, thousands of innocent Algerian natives would be killed in the cross-fire. This strategy of fighting terror with terror employed by the French government had unsustaining results while at same time indirectly helping the FLN’s cause. By killing so many Algerian natives, the French government labelled itself as the bad guy, making it easier for the FLN to recruit and garner public support. In the long run the French would ultimately fail in controlling the FLN resulting in the withdrawal of French forces in Algeria. As we can see, the French government’s use of unproportionate response to FLN actions was counterproductive in preserving their colonial control over Algeria. In essence, by retaliating as harshly as they did they indirectly legitimized the FLN’s cause while at the same time weakening their own position of authority.
When looking at the Arab conflict concerning Israel and Palestine, Israel’s strategy to combat the PLO and Hamas has had a very similar result to that of the French government in Algeria. Although the conflict over Israel’s territorial claims in the past has been between her and her Arab neighbors, in more recent history it has been an internal conflict with the Palestinians. The reason I bring this up is to give context to the fact that throughout Israel’s existence, her military endeavors have always yielded greater casualties for her enemies than for herself. Israel’s military capabilities are far ahead many of the countries in the Middle-East. So when she is faced with fighting an internal conflict she is more than well-equipped to handle the situation in an aggressive military manner. This has been the case when dealing in response to various violent actions committed against her by the PLO and Hamas. Every time either of these two groups have lashed out against Israel and her authority, her response has been that of quick and of brute force.
During the first Intifada sparked by the PLO from 1987-1991, only 164 Israelis died in comparison to 1,000 Palestinian deaths. The second Intifada, this time started by Hamas, from 2000-2005 saw a more equal distribution in casualties with 1,000 Israelis killed in comparison to 3,000 Palestinians. However, this example still shows the military capabilities Israel has in terms of inflicting casualties against her enemies. In most recent history the 2014 Gaza Conflict, which saw Hamas using long range missiles to target civilian populations within Israel, the discrepancy in death tolls is a telling scene. With only 70 Israelis killed, Israel’s response resulted in the deaths of about 2,000 Palestinians. This continual use of her vastly superior military force to kill thousands of Palestinians in an attempt to curb the operations of these supposed terrorist groups, has only garnered them more support. Particularly with Hamas, Israel’s overtly retaliatory responses have strengthened its position within Palestine. As noted by Jonathan Schanzer in his article, The Challenge of Hamas to Fatah, “Hamas is able to kill two birds with one stone. By Attacking Israel, it boosts its popularity with Palestinians, and elicits an Israeli retaliation that, in most instances, damages the PA and possibly paves the way to Fatah’s disintegration. Given these tangible rewards for terror, Hamas has no reason to desist” (Schanzer).
Although Israel’s unproportionate responses to Palestinian uprisings are not the only reasons to the growth of groups such as the PLO and Hamas, they definitely have played a significant role. Similar to that of the French government, Israel is indirectly strengthening the cause these groups stand for by retaliating so harshly. Labeling themselves the bad guys, Israel alienates itself from the Palestinian communities within its own country thus laying the groundwork for groups such as the PLO and Hamas to exist in the first place. Ultimately, this has resulted in Israel being unsuccessful in relinquishing any sort of resistance by the Palestinians and perpetuating a never ending cycle of violent conflict that is still being seen today.

Bibliography

Schanzer, Jonathan. "The Challenge of Hamas to Fatah." Middle East Forum. Spring 2003. Accessed March 20, 2017. http://www.meforum.org/516/the-challenge-of-hamas-to-fatah.

Thomas, Martin C.,"Violence in the Algerian war of Independence", in The Routledge History of Terrorism ed. Randall D. Law. (Abington: Routledge, 02 Apr 2015 )

4 comments:

  1. David,

    How might you measure proportionality if you were to design proportional responses to terrorism? What might some options be?

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    1. I measure proportionality by looking at the extent people who aren't involved are affected negatively by the actions taken to curb terrorism. This includes but is not limited to death, personal injury, oppression, censorship, and segregation. If we look at the French government's response to the FLN's actions we can clearly see how they negatively affected the lives of innocent civilians. As I noted in my post, the French government worked alongside Algerian authorities and purposefully sought after and persecuted individuals merely based off of suspicion. Martin makes the same point in his article noting, "the [French] army worked more closely with [Algerian] police and gendarmerie commanders in refining techniques of social control that included collective punishments against rural settlements, mass detention (predominantly of young adult males),and the use of torture in suspect interrogations" (Martin 221). Clearly the French government was affecting more than just the individuals who were in the FLN. In essence, their methods produced profound collateral damage (not only pertaining to death).

      To address then what would be proportional responses to terrorism, would be responses that revolve around specifically targeting individuals or groups of individuals known to be apart of the larger group at hand in ways that do not affect others living around them. This type of response would be accomplished most easily through strategies that incorporated stealth since it would provide a mitigation to collateral damage. In more modern times there is also the option of using drones since they have proven to be effective weapons at combating terror without resulting in profound collateral damage to civilians and innocence. I acknowledge that both of these responses are subject to ridicule since many would argue, specifically with drone strikes, that they will/do still cause collateral damage. However, to say that no one will be caught in the cross-fire is irrational. In every situation where there is conflict, innocence will die. Regardless of this sad fact, these would be the responses best suited not to be seen as unproportionate. By focusing on strategies that utilize stealth to specifically target and eliminate individuals or groups, you at the same time keep the prominence of the conflict at hand small in the public eye. Thus curbing the terrorist group's capability to function and its capability to garner public support.

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  2. David,

    Wow, lots to work with. You note how Israel continues to crush PLO and HAMAS uprisings with their superior military strength. Do you think there is any other way to combat those terrorist uprisings besides horrific violence?

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  3. David, I agree that a violent response is not beneficial in the long run, but if a group is being violent they need to be stopped immediately. However, once this is taken care of, you need to check the cause of the violence and try and make a change so it does not occur again. I think this is a main issue in modern conflicts, we are quick to use violence, but slow to change the issues being the violent uprising.

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