Abu Sayyaf and al Qaeda

            Terrorism, as we know, is a term that incredibly difficult to find a one definition that is widely accepted. An even more difficult task is accurately labeling a group or specific people as terrorist organizations or individual terrorists. This quagmire is demonstrated in categorizing some groups, whereas it extremely easier to determine the category of other groups. The two groups, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and al Qaeda fit the scenario just mentioned perfectly. Where it is difficult to concretely declare the ASG a terrorist group, it couldn’t be clearer that al Qaeda is a terrorist group. I believe that due to the more criminal nature of the acts committed by Abu Sayyaf, as compared to the large-scale acts of terror committed by al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf should not be categorized as a terrorist group.

            Motive behind any action is usually the determining factor on how that act is labeled. Under the leadership of Ghalib Andang, also known as Commander Robot, the ASG was a bandit group than anything else during his time in command. The “‘entrepreneurs of violence,’” as they have been called, use kidnappings of foreigners on vacation or foreign journalists as some of their most profitable operations (Santos and Dinampo, 126). In the cases of the Sipdan and Dos Palmas kidnappings, “it soon became clear that money was the object,” and the kidnappings were purely criminal (Santos and Dinampo, 126). Islamic beliefs and political motives were never a real factor for kidnappings, as one person who was kidnapped learned, “they were only out to make money,” and that “they only used Islam as a front,” because “it was easy for them to recruit followers because they offered huge sums to entice people to join them” (Santos and Dinampo, 126). Kidnapping people for monetary gains should not be a deciding factor in why a group is labeled as terrorists – it does not separate them from any other criminal on the street looking to make a quick buck.

            This is unlike al Qaeda’s motives for their attacks. Clearly slated in fundamentalist Islamic beliefs, Osama bin Laden proclaimed to all of his jihadist followers, “Cavalry of Islam, be mounted...You should know that your coming-together and cooperation in order to liberate the holy places of Islam is the right step towards unification of the word of our umma under the banner of God’s unity” (Lawrence, 30). Al Qaeda should be categorized as a terrorist organization because they commit attacks of terror in the name of Islam. Most definitions of terrorism note the importance of a religious or political motive, as clearly seen in al Qaeda and noticeably absent from the ASG.

            However, with a shift in leadership, it looks as though the ASG is becoming more terroristic in nature. With more attacks towards “civilians or non-combatants, and spreading terror or extreme fear among the civilian population related to some political objective,” the ASG seems to be shifting towards a more radicalized group (Santos and Dinampo, 130). Though those characteristics of their attacks fit within most definitions of terrorism, I still believe that because the ASG should not be deemed a terrorist group. First, the ASG acted much more like criminals than terrorists in the early 2000’s, which saw a rise of international terrorism, therefore it is too early to categorize them other than radical criminals with substantial funds to fund their semi-rogue attacks. Second, there is no firm stance for political reform or the spread of religion with the ASG, a key factor separating terrorist attacks from isolated attacks of violence.

Bibliography

Lawrence, Bruce. Messages to the World – The Statements of Osama bin Laden. New York:         Verso, 2005. 30.

Santos, Soliman M., Paz Verdades M. Santos, Octavio A. Dinampo, and Diana Rodriguez. "Abu   Sayyaf Reloaded: Rebels, Agents, Bandits, Terrorists (Case Study)." Primed and             Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva:            Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2010. 126-30.